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Central Asia – i.e. the area encompassing the five former Soviet 
“Stans” of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan – has been dubbed “the region that isn’t”1, an area 
whose post-Soviet development has been shaped by the persis-
tent inconsistency or failure of regional cooperation schemes. 
As a matter of fact, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have 
not managed to put forward efficient durable and inclusive for-
mats for institutional cooperation, either in the security or eco-
nomic realms and, in comparison with other regional environ-
ments, the area is one of the less integrated in both strategic and 
economic terms. Therefore, while Central Asia can be viewed 
as a region in purely geographic or cultural terms, apparently it 
does not behave as such in institutional ones.
The lack of inclusive formats for regional integration is all 
the more blatant in consideration of the evident proliferation of 
regional mechanisms for cooperation, which, consistently with 
a wider trend unfolding in the whole post-Soviet space, did not 
bring any concrete result in terms of integration, justifying the 
theory of a merely “ephemeral regionalism”2. The weakness – if 
1 B. Kausikan, F. Starr and Y. Cheng, “Central Asia: All Together Now”, The 
American Interest, 16 June 2017.
2 In proposing this label, Wirminghaus highlights that between 1991 and 2010 
a total of  36 initiatives of  cooperation came into being in the former Soviet 
Union area, 28 just in the first decade after USSR dissolution. N. Wirminghaus, 
“Ephemeral regionalism: The proliferation of  (failed) regional integration 
initiatives in post-soviet Eurasia”, in T. Börzel et al. (Eds.), Roads to Regionalism: 
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not the absence – of a Central Asian regionalist path appears 
blatant also because the area seems to possess all the basic mate-
rial and immaterial features that, according to the mainstream 
literature on regionalism, are conducive to the establishment of 
regional frameworks for cooperation and integration, in geo-
graphical as well as in cultural and economic terms. At the time 
of independence from the Soviet Union, and largely as a conse-
quence of its institutional peculiarities, the CARs were indeed 
bound together by the legacy of the previous economic system, 
based upon functional specialization and interdependence be-
tween its Republics3. Moreover, their productive apparatuses 
were interconnected not only in terms of economic speciali-
zations, but also in terms of infrastructural networks, which, 
notwithstanding their eminently Russo-centric nature, were 
critically important for a region shaped by a land-locked con-
dition and by its peripheral location with respect to the main 
Eurasian trade channels4. 
Genesis, Design, and Effects of  Regional Organizations, London - New York, Routledge, 
2012, p. 25.
3 In 1991, intra-USSR economic exchange between the Central Asian Socialist 
Republics and the other SSRs (excepting Russia, given its international exports 
of  energy and raw materials) accounted for a quota of  the total turnover between 
87% and 99.5%. I. Burakovsky, “Economic Integration and Security in the Post-
Soviet Space”, in R. Legvold and C. Wallander (Eds.), Swords and Sustenance. The 
Economics of  Security in Belarus and Ukraine, Cambridge and London,  MIT Press, 
2004, p. 164.
4 Although only Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are strictly land-locked 
– with the latter being one of  only two countries in the world (the other being 
Luxembourg) that are “doubly land-locked” – nevertheless the Caspian littoral 
states also share the main features of  land-lockness. As far Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan are concerned, access through the basin to the Volga River does 
not exclude them from the aforesaid category. Indeed, as Glassner noted, the 
category includes those states “which have access to the sea via internationalized 
navigable rivers […]. Such states [...] consider themselves land-locked and are 
here considered land-locked because they do not exercise ‘sovereign’ control 
over their aqueous highways to the sea”. I. Glassner, Access to the Sea for Developing 
Land-Locked States, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, p. 2.
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Besides economic and physical incentives to cooperation, the 
CARs were also bound together in security terms, given the pre-
vailing transnational character of the threats to regional stabili-
ty. First and foremost, the arbitrary Soviet drawing of Socialist 
Republics’ borders inherited by the CARs left them the peril-
ous legacy of latent ethno-territorial tensions resulting from the 
widespread presence of minorities ethnically akin to neighbor-
ing states’ “titular” nationality (see tab. no.1), as well as from 
sovereignty disputes over contested territories5. Secondly, the 
environmental hazards resulting from the Soviet over-exploita-
tion of the Aral Sea for agricultural purposes further bound 
Central Asian states together, the more so as a consequence of 
their reliance on shared water resources.  
Tab. 1 - CARs’ ethnic composition in 1989: titular 
nationalities and minorities akin to neighboring SSRs
Source: T. Atabaki and S. Mehendale (eds.), Central Asia and the Caucasus: 
Transnationalism and Diaspora, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 5.
While the above-mentioned factors naturally resulted in the 
wide range of scholars’ attention to and debate about regional 
integration trends and dynamics, interest in Central Asia grew 
5 For an overview of  the consequence of  Soviet border-drawing legacy, see: 
International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Border disputes and conflict potential, ICG 
Asia Report No. 33, Osh and Brussels, International Crisis Group, 2002.
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
Kazakhs 39.6% 0.8% 0.2% 2.4% 4.0%
Kyrgyz -- 52.3% 1.2% -- 0.8%
Tajiks -- 0.7% 62.2% -- 4.7%
Turkmen 0.1% -- 0.3% 72.0% 0.6%
Uzbeks 2.0% 12.9% 23.5% 8.9% 71.3%
Russians 37.8% 21.5% 7.6% 9.4% 8.3%
Population 16,46,000 4,258,000 5,093,000 3,523,000 19,810,000
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also as a consequence of the significant role the area came to 
play in the post-bipolar environment, as a consequence of its 
peculiar geopolitical features. The latter, indeed, not only in-
fluenced local actors’ opportunity-risk perceptions and their 
attitudes towards inter-state cooperation, but also shaped a 
seeming competition for regional influence among major pow-
ers that generated abundant literature regarding the so-called 
“New Great Game”.
The main geopolitical feature of the area is its precise geo-
graphical location in the heart of the Eurasian landmass, which 
made Central Asia, at different times, a conduit for exchanges 
of ideas and commerce among the world’s main civilizations 
and empires or, alternatively, a friction point among them – i.e. 
a “land bridge role” best epitomized by the Silk Route epos, or a 
ground for confrontation as was the case at the time of the XIX 
century Russian-British “Great Game”. Ever since the dissolu-
tion of the USSR, the geostrategic value of an area occupying 
a pivotal position between the main Eurasian security chess-
boards resurfaced from the ashes of strict Soviet rule, re-ignit-
ing a competition for influence involving not only neighboring 
powers, but also global actors, first and foremost the Unites 
States and to a lesser extent the European Union. 
The second, equally important Central Asian geopolitical fac-
tor is the availability of a significant raw materials base, first and 
foremost in terms of hydrocarbon reserves. While unevenly dis-
tributed across the region, all in all sub-regional proven reserves 
of oil and gas account respectively for 1.9% and 17.8% of the 
world’s proven reserves6. Given the magnitude of these regional 
6 The regional oil reserves are concentrated mainly in Kazakhstan (30 thousand 
million barrels) and to a lesser extent in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (0,6 
thousand millions each). With reserves inferior on a world-scale only to Russian, 
Iranian and Qatari ones (17,5 Trillion cubic metres), Turkmenistan is regional 
power-house in terms of  gas reservers, while Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
possess only limited yet significant reserves (1,1 and 1 respectively). Meanwhile, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are not endowed with hydrocarbon resources. Bp, BP 
Statistical Review of  World Energy, June 2017, www.bp.com/statisticalreview 
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hydrocarbons’ reserves, it is hard to overestimate the role the 
energy sector came to play not only for the CARs’ domestic 
and foreign policy, but also for extra-regional energy-consum-
ing powers’ projection toward the area, aimed at expanding and 
diversifying their supply sources and channels. 
Making use of an eclectic analytical perspective integrating 
constructivist and neo-realist frameworks for analysis, the arti-
cle aims at appraising how the nexus between identity, security 
and economic development policies impinged upon the un-
folding of regional cooperation schemes, highlighting the rea-
sons why in Central Asia national and regional interests hardly 
align, leaving room for competition and confrontation among 
the CARs instead of fostering cooperation and interdependence 
trends. Moreover, while the appraisal of the various cooperation 
schemes involving the CARs falls outside the scope of the pres-
ent article, the latter aims at summarising the regional frame-
works’ main features, starting from the rationale behind their 
initiation or their membership. In order to do so, after intro-
ducing the peculiar nexus between the post-Soviet nation- and 
state-building processes and their repercussions on attitudes 
towards cooperation, the article will focus on regional organ-
isations’ recurring and intertwined features, here grouped for 
convenience under three main headings: the priority of secu-
rity over economic development; the balancing logic influenc-
ing regional leaderships’ choices; the prevalence progressively 
gained by externally-driven frameworks for cooperation. 
For the purposes of this article, notwithstanding all the 
afore-mentioned limitations in strictly behavioral terms, 
Central Asia is seen and referred to as a “region”, in the sense of 
a compact geographical area that shares important geopolitical, 
historical, cultural, social and economic bonds – i.e. those fac-
tors which generally lead the greater part of scholars as well as 
the main Euro-Atlantic institutions to identify the CARs as a 
natural grouping of states.
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Identity politics and inter-state relations 
in Central Asia
The USSR’s dissolution initiated in newly independent Central 
Asian states a complex and multiform transition phase, occur-
ring at the institutional level as well as at political, economic 
and, no less significantly, identity levels. That is, the need to 
construct on the ashes of the Soviet social pact a new bond 
for national belonging and for civic participation overlapped 
– and, to a great extent, mixed – with the parallel urgency 
to ensure substance to the abruptly achieved full sovereignty. 
Therefore, the processes of state and nation building not only 
chronologically overlapped, but also obviously nourished each 
other, in a context made more complex by the profound social, 
institutional and economic crises left behind by the dissolution 
of the Soviet state system. While the state-building process was 
made more complex by the rapidity of the process leading to 
USSR dissolution, by the local leaderships’ lack of previous ex-
perience and by the absence of those intellectual and nationalist 
forces that had guided countries towards independence in other 
areas of the Union7, the nation-building process was strongly 
influenced by the USSR legacy, influencing both the foreign 
policy-making process and the resulting attitudes towards a re-
gional integration process.
The spreading of a sense of national belonging throughout 
Central Asia is a relatively recent phenomenon, initiated during 
the modernisation process occurring under Russian imperial 
rule and culminating under the Soviet’s8. It was primarily the 
7 See M. Brill Olcott, “Central Asia’s Catapult to Independence”, Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 71, no. 3, 1992, pp. 108-130; M. Beisinger, Nationalist  Mobilization  and  the 
Collapse  of   the  Soviet  State, Cambridge, Cambridge University  Press, 2002.
8 As for the main features of  Soviet nationality engineering see: F. Hirsch, 
Empire of  Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of  the Soviet Union, Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press, 2005; T. Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nation 
and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2001. See also: 
A. Haugen, The Establishment of  National Republics in Soviet Central Asia, New York, 
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latter’s peculiar concept of nation that most influenced the way 
in which post-Soviet leaderships came to understand, portray 
and pursue the national project. That is, if Hobsbawn’s theory 
that “nations do not make states and nationalisms but the oth-
er way round”9 holds true, nowhere like in Central Asia does 
this process appear so evident10 and, at the same time, nothing 
proved more influential in fostering ethnic self-consciousness 
and in setting the parameters for the development of a sense of 
national affiliation among Central Asian leaderships than the 
Soviet nationality-based federal system. Accordingly, the na-
tion-building process was shaped by what has been described11 
as a three-fold process: the essentialisation and primordialisation 
of the nation, i.e. the identification of its essential traits and 
their representation as linear, continuous and singular; the his-
toricization of the nation, pursued through the rediscovery of an 
ethnic past and through a selective history generating national 
myths and symbols; the totalization of the nation, aimed at the 
“collectivization” of individuals, which turns relative differences 
into absolute ones. On this backdrop, Central Asian suprana-
tional, civilizational or regional identities proved to be much 
weaker than the national (and even sub-national) one12, with 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 
9 E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, myth, reality, 2nd ed., 
New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.10. In the same vein, E. Gellner, 
Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983; B. Anderson, 
Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of  Nationalism, 3rd ed., 
London and New York, Verso, 1996.
10 W. Van Schendel and E. Zurcher (eds.), Identity Politics in Central Asia and the 
Muslim World. Nationalism, Ethnicity and Labour in the Twentieth Century, London and 
New York, Tauris, 2001.
11 G. Smith, “Post-colonialism and Borderland Identities”, in G. Smith et al. 
(Eds.), Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The Politics of  National Identities, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.15-16. 
12 R.G. Suny, “Provisional Stabilities. The Politics of  Identities in Post-Soviet 
Eurasia”, International Security, vol. 24, no. 3, 1999-2000, p. 165. As for the 
influence of  sub-national – i.e. local and clan – identities on the post-Soviet 
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the latter being shaped by the primordial Soviet concept, which 
contributed to the spreading of an ethno-territorial conception 
of nationalism hampering inter-state cooperation.
The ethno-territorial concept of the nation more often than 
not resulted in competing nationalisms, which, by juxtaposing 
opposing historical narratives, ended up by driving the CARs 
apart rather than bringing them closer under a common re-
gional identity. Two key elements help clarify how identity, far 
from being an impetus for regional aggregation, worked on 
the contrary as a strategic polarisation factor. First and fore-
most, national identity became a source of legitimation for the 
possession of a given territory, i.e. for the relationship between 
a nation and a territory deemed as ancestral. In a region like 
Central Asia, where the process of boundary-making had been 
highly arbitrary, the exclusionary concept of the nation nat-
urally resulted in opposing historical narratives and, thus, in 
tensions between neighboring countries. This is particularly 
the case with Uzbek and Tajik – and, to a lesser extent, Kyrgyz 
– ethno-territorial nationalisms, with the latter being the mir-
ror image of the former in building the nation’s historicisation 
process upon the same founding myths13. Secondly, the pri-
mordialisation and the  historicisation of the nation became a 
source of legitimation not only for the incumbent post-Soviet 
leaderships, but also for the “historical missions” they had and 
were interpreters of. Thus, the affirmation of national identity 
became a privileged tool for regional power competition, as ap-
pears particularly manifest in the case of Uzbekistan’s hegemon-
ic ambitions (see below). 
The indirectly proportional relationship between the develop-
ment of an ethno-territorially based nationalism and a positive 
attitude toward inter-state cooperation seems to be validated, in 
transition see Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, Cambridge 
and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
13 S. Abashin, “Nation-construction in post-Soviet Central Asia”, in M, Bassin 
and C. Kelly (Eds.), Soviet and post-Soviet identities, Cambridge and New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 163-164.
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an opposite perspective, also by the Kazakh case. Chiefly by vir-
tue of the peculiar ethnic composition of Kazakhstan – where 
in 1991 Kazakhs were only a minority of the whole population 
(see Table 1) – the newly independent republic developed a civ-
ic-based understanding of the nation. Therefore, in a de facto 
bi-national Russian-Kazakh state, the “Kazakhisation” of the 
country has coexisted with the promotion of a “multinational 
state in which all the “Kazakhstanis” would have equal civic 
rights and opportunities”14. The Kazakhstan leadership’s legiti-
mation strategies were therefore chiefly output-based rather than 
input-based15, i.e. less dependent on founding myths than on 
performance, intended in terms of domestic economic devel-
opment as well as in terms of foreign policy behaviour and in-
ternational recognition. The latter, supported by an export-led 
development strategy16, naturally resulted in a more positive at-
titude not only towards participation in international fora, but 
also towards regional cooperation and integration, with a view 
to enhancing and exploiting its comparatively greater economic 
strength to advance a leadership role in Central Asia. Astana’s 
preference for a cooperation – and, potentially, integration – 
path revolving around economic and trade arrangements re-
sulted in the formation of the rare frameworks involving exclu-
sively Central Asian actors. Such was the case, in particular, for 
the Central Asian Economic Cooperation (CAEC) established 
in 1994 by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (joined 
by Tajikistan in 1998) and re-launched as the Central Asian 
Cooperation Organization (CACO) in 2002. Such initiatives, 
however, fell victim to intra-regional power competition with 
14 R.G. Suny (1999-2000), p. 174. See also: A. Del Sordi, “Legitimation and the 
Party of  Power in Kazakhstan”, in M. Brusis, J. Ahrens and M. Schulze Wessel 
(Eds.), Politics and legitimacy in post-Soviet Eurasia, Houndmills and Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 72-96. 
15 C. von Soest and J. Grauvogel, “Comparing Legitimation Strategies in Post-
Soviet Countries”, in M. Brusis et al. (2016), pp. 18-46.
16 G. Gleason, Markets and Politics in Central Asia. Structural reform and political change, 
London - New York, Taylor & Francis, 2003, pp. 52-53.
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Uzbekistan (see below), progressively shifting Kazakh prefer-
ences for cooperation from a purely regional perspective to a 
supra-regional one that included Russia. In doing so, Astana de 
facto ceased to perceive itself as a constituent part of a Central 
Asian region,  instead considering “Russia to be an integral part 
of any region or sub-region to which it belongs”17. Consistently 
with this trend, CACO – the only remaining purely Central 
Asian organisation – merged with the Russian-led Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEC) and ceased to exist in 2005. 
In a broader view, supranational, civilisational or regional 
identities in no case proved to be viable drivers for enhancing 
inter-state cooperation among Central Asian states as well as 
between the latter and extra-regional kin states. This trend ap-
parently emerged in relation to the two key common identity 
features of the CARs18, which in the aftermath of the USSR’s 
dissolution many scholars and practitioners predicted – or, 
rather, feared – would have superseded the discredited Soviet 
social pact. The reference here goes, on the one hand, to the eth-
no-linguistic Turkic matrix shared by most of the CARs – with 
the only exception of Tajikistan – and, on the other, to religious 
affiliation with Islam. Indeed, since Russian imperial times to 
date Islam has been the main shared source of identification 
for Central Asian peoples and, after gaining independence, the 
CARs almost naturally sought to reaffirm their belonging to 
the Ummah19. However, while this attitude drove them to join 
the main international institutions of the Islamic community – 
namely, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which they 
all joined between 1992 and 1996 – it did not count as an 
17 A. Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order”, 
International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 3,  2004, p. 493.
18 K. Gharabaghi, “New Regionalisms in Central Asia in the 1990s”, in L. Swatuk 
and T. Shaw (Eds.), The South at the End of  the Twentieth Century, London, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1994, p. 142.
19 M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse, Regional Organisations in Central Asia: Patterns of  
Interaction, Dilemmas of   Efficiency, Working paper no.10, Institute for Public Policy 
and Administration, 2012, p. 16.
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incentive to develop intra-regional or supra-regional alignment 
based upon shared religious faith. This has chiefly to do with the 
peculiar nature of Central Asian Islam, which bears an inclusive 
cultural and even spatial identity rather than a strictly religious 
one20. At the same time, this once again calls into question the 
relationship between state- and nation-building processes since 
post-Soviet leaderships almost unanimously perceived the risk 
associated with Islamism – in terms of both foreign influence 
and the rise of a non-state source of political loyalty21 – and, 
consequentially, downgraded the contribution given by religion 
to national identity and adopted rigid mechanisms to subordi-
nate Islam and its clergy to the state apparatus.
Cultural kinship did not account for a steady cooperation 
incentive even in the case of the shared ethno-linguistic Turkic 
bonds. While the Turkic CARs joined the Turkey-sponsored 
framework for dialogue and cultural promotion22, they did not 
subscribe to Ankara’s attempt to found upon ethno-linguistic 
kinship a political-diplomatic platform or alignment with a 
more or less latent pan-Turkic spirit. In doing so, they demon-
strated that, as the nexus between identity and foreign policy 
came to the fore, the latter had a natural priority over the for-
mer. In the specific case, the refusal to subscribe to a highly po-
liticized initiative first and foremost exposed the CARs’ reluc-
tance to curtail room for diplomatic maneuver – i.e. channeling 
20 R.G. Suny (1999-2000), p. 166.
21 P. Kubicek, “Regionalism, nationalism and Realpolitik in Central Asia”, Europe-
Asia Studies, vol. 49, no. 4, 1997, p. 647.
22 Cooperation among Turkic CARs and Turkey developed within the framework 
of  the “Heads of  State Summit of  Turkish Speaking Countries”, launched in 
1992 and supported by the establishment of  the Joint Administration of  Turkic 
Arts and Culture (TÜRKSOY, 1993). In 2008, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
along with  in  Turkey and Azerbaijan, signed an agreement establishing the 
Parliamentary Assembly of  Turkic-speaking Countries (TÜRKPA). Finally, in 
2010 the Cooperation Council of  Turkic Speaking Countries was established as 
the umbrella organization for the cooperation mechanisms developed among the 
four above-mentioned countries.
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foreign relations through Ankara – as well as to antagonize two 
of their most influential neighbors, Russia and Iran, which 
viewed Turkey’s regional initiatives with suspicion23. 
The analysis of the nexus between the nation-building and 
the foreign policy-making processes occurring in the CARs in 
the aftermath of 1991 shows two crucial and interconnected 
trends. First and foremost, the regional unifying factors in re-
ligious or cultural terms neither presided over nor facilitated 
inter-state cooperation, at either the regional or supranation-
al level. Quite on the contrary, the ethno-territorial matrix of 
post-Soviet nation-building supported regional hegemonic 
projects and feeded inter-state tensions, running counter to in-
tegration and fostering centrifugal forces. Second – as will be 
seen in the next paragraph – the confusion, widespread among 
the CARs’ leaderships, between the recognition and the pro-
motion of a regional identity, on the one hand, and the pursuit 
of a regionalist agenda with supranational features potentially 
limiting countries’ sovereignty on the other, led local actors to 
deny the very existence of any shared Central Asian identity 
and to perceive nation-building and region-building as largely 
contradictory pursuits24.
The “security-first” approach to cooperation
Security needs have been paramount for the CARs. Securing 
their newly acquired independence from the multi-faceted do-
mestic and external threats endangering state structures super-
seded the other urgencies inscribed in the post-Soviet transition 
period, including the economic. In turn, the “security-first” 
approach to the state-building process has had manifest reper-
cussions on the leaderships’ preferences towards inter-state rela-
tions and cooperation.
23 For a wider account, P. Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the 
Cold War, London, Hurst, 2003, pp.270-293.
24 M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse, (2012); P. Kubicek (1997).
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First and foremost, the security-first approach resulted in the 
CARs’ reluctance to renounce sovereign prerogatives to supra-
national authorities in order to multilaterally tackle the regional 
and trans-national issues which would have required a deeper 
degree of coordination. Therefore the CARs’ preferences natu-
rally went to loose forms of cooperation, which did not endan-
ger national sovereignty and which were consistent with one of 
the main motivations behind the CARs’ participation in coop-
eration mechanisms, at both the regional and supra-regional 
levels. The reference here is to the legitimation and recognition 
strategies pursued through membership in multilateral organ-
isations, which can be seen as the main drivers behind the cre-
ation and the (seemingly paradoxical) conservation of the var-
ious regional and supra-regional frameworks lacking concrete 
substance or implementation strategies – thereby supporting 
the idea of mere “ink-on-paper” or “virtual” integration un-
folding in the region25. These kinds of cooperation frameworks 
– similar to the ones recently labeled “Rhetorical Integration” 
mechanisms26 – served chiefly as proxies for international rec-
ognition and were thus useful to “sovereignty-boost” strategies 
and needs27, particularly felt by nascent or weak states, as the 
CARs used to be especially during the 1990s. As such, they pur-
sue mainly expressive goals, whose “utility is derived from action 
itself, regardless of whether it leads to any specific outcome”28. 
25 See respectively: A. Libman, “Regionalisation and regionalism in the post-Soviet 
space: Current status and implications for institutional development”, Europe-
Asia Studies, vol. 59 no. 3, 2007, pp. 401-430; R. Allison, “Virtual regionalism, 
regional structures and regime security in Central Asia”, Central Asian Survey, vol. 
27, no. 2, 2008, pp. 185-202.
26 E. Vinokurov and A. Libman, Re-Evaluating Regional Organizations. Behind the 
Smokescreen of  Official Mandates, Basingstoke - New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2017, pp. 21-23.
27 F. Söderbaum, “Modes of  Regional Governance in Africa: Neoliberalism, 
Sovereignty-boosting and Shadow Networks’, Global Governance, Vol. 10, No. 4, 
2004, pp 419-436.
28 E. Vinokurov and A. Libman (2017), p.16.
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From this logic stems the CARs participation in most of the re-
gional arrangements, especially the ones joined in the first dec-
ade following independence – including the above-mentioned 
ones based upon supranational Islamic or Turkic identities.
The post-Soviet legitimation strategies unfolding in the 
Central Asian states had another yet significant repercussion on 
the CARs’ attitudes toward and expectations from regional co-
operation. Despite the obvious differences among the Central 
Asian states, a common feature of the regional state-building 
processes was a concept of national interest which, building 
upon traditional social structures and the contingent difficulties 
of the post-Soviet transition, naturally prioritised political sta-
bility and social order29. This output-based legitimation strate-
gy typically mixed with an opposite yet connected input-based 
one, resulting from the circumstance that the CARs’ post-So-
viet leaderships generally portrayed and legitimised themselves 
as the embodiment of the nation and the national will30. This 
combination, in turn, had direct and deep repercussions on the 
concept and boundaries of the national security paradigm. In 
a regional environment where the state and the nation almost 
totally coincide, the personalism-based legitimation strategies 
made national leaderships the natural linchpin between them. 
Therefore, the security of the state came to overlap with the 
security of regimes portraying themselves as the guarantors of 
stability and social order. Apart from the consequences on the 
domestic level, on the external plane the widespread tenden-
cy to participate in Rhetorical Integration frameworks resulted 
not merely from sovereignty-boost aims, but also from more 
specific “regime-boost” objectives.31
29 D. Lewis, “Central Asia: Contested Peace”, in O. Richmond et al. (eds.), The 
Palgrave Handbook of  Disciplinary and Regional Approaches to Peace, Basingstoke and 
New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp.387-397.
30 C. von Soest and J. Grauvogel (2016), pp.33-34.
31 E. Vinokurov and A. Libman (2017), p.22; See also: K. Collins, “Economic and 
Security Regionalism among Patrimonial Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of  
Central Asia”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol.61, no.2 (2009), pp.249-281; R. Allison (2008).
The Drivers behind Cooperation in Central Asia 171
The security-first approach is also crucial to understanding 
the drivers behind the evolution of sub-regional cooperation 
in economic terms. The typical economic trade-off between 
“guns or butter”, between security needs and a commitment 
to people’s well-being was solved by the CARs leaderships’ pri-
oritising the former over the latter, thereby avoiding the risk 
associated with the reduction in national autonomy inscribed 
by definition in economic integration paths. At the same time, 
some authors have argued that it was not only the security of 
the states that hindered the economic cooperation path, but 
also the understanding of security as regime security, which 
negatively affected local leaderships’ attitudes toward economic 
liberalisation which, in turn, is a logical premise for economic 
regionalism32. 
Apart from the lack of market-oriented reforms, the Central 
Asian states’ prioritisation of security over development 
emerged from two main trends. The first, particularly visible 
in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, results from the tendency to 
build economic development upon the myth of “self-sufficien-
cy”, which led to a lukewarm propensity toward cooperation 
and, instead, to the extensive use of protectionist measures 
and limitations to the free movement of goods and persons33. 
Secondly, intra-regional competition and mistrust between 
the CARs hindered cooperation, even where it appeared to be 
pursuable in a win-win perspective. As a matter of fact, while 
regional economic integration was certainly obstructed by ob-
jective factors resulting from peculiarities in the national pro-
ductive apparatuses,34 it was definitely hindered by subjective 
ones, having to do with the CARs’ risk-opportunity percep-
tions resulting from the security-first mindset. As a confir-
mation of the security-first approach, inter-state cooperation 
32 K. Collins (2009).
33 G. Gleason (2003).
34 R. Pomfret, “Regional integration in Central Asia”, Economic Change and 
Restructuring, vol.42, no.1, 2009, pp.47-68.
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was not pursued even in those important sectors where the 
CARs displayed a significant level of complementarity, name-
ly in the exploitation of regional natural resources. Indeed the 
CARs benefiting from the availability of hydrocarbons – and in 
particular Uzbekistan – are also the poorest in terms of water 
resources, while the countries benefiting from hydropower re-
sources – i.e. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – possess no indigenous 
oil and gas reserves. However, the logic of a mutually benefiting 
exchange between energy and water never worked, hampered 
by the use of resources– especially on the Uzbek side – as a 
tool for confrontation and coercion rather than cooperation. 
Moreover, as far as Turkmenistan is concerned, the rationale be-
hind the search fo self-sufficiency in economic terms seemingly 
operated also in strategic ones. That is, the resolve to preserve 
the country’s territorial integrity and to guarantee its security 
led to a policy of “positive neutrality” which de facto resulted 
in a self-imposed isolation from cooperation at both economic 
and strategic levels, hampering in turn the development of in-
clusive regional frameworks.
On this backdrop, it is not surprising that the only economic 
integration paths involving some of the CARs which accom-
plished any result – i.e. the successive Russian-led initiatives 
heading towards Eurasian Union – were non-inclusive trans-re-
gional projects, focusing on a limited number of highly comple-
mentary economies.35 Consistently with the above-mentioned 
vision of regional cooperation, Kazakhstan, which inherited a 
national economy deeply ingrained with the Russian, has tra-
ditionally been a staunch supporter of and participant in the 
35 The reference is, in particular, to the 2003 Single Economic Space (SES) and 
to the Customs Union (CU), involving Kazakhstan but excluding Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, “non-preferential trade partners” – as they were labelled by Bohr 
(2004, p.493) – which instead had been founding members of  the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEC), in whose framework both the SES and the 
CU were proposed. Kyrgyzstan, however, entered the CU in January 2015, with 
a view to joining the Eurasian Economic Union, the latest step in the Eurasian 
integration project.
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Eurasian integration project, whose current stage – namely the 
Eurasian Economic Union – also involves Kyrgyzstan.
The multi-layered power competition 
in and over Central Asia
An apparent paradox seen in the evolution of Central Asian 
cooperation is that, notwithstanding the paramount impor-
tance the CARs give to security considerations, and in spite of 
the characteristic trans-national nature of regional threats, the 
security-first approach did not result in the creation of sound 
multilateral mechanisms for cooperation. This was the conse-
quence of a complex mixture of objective limitations and sub-
jective factors, having to do with regional actors’ perceptions 
and attitudes. That is, the CARs’ leaderships lacked both the 
capabilities and the common will to set up effective multilateral 
frameworks for security cooperation. 
Lack of capabilities points first and foremost to the CARs’ 
inability to control the regional security dynamics unfolding 
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and shaped, over time, 
also by the competitive engagement of external powers.36 The 
trans-regional nature of Central Asian dynamics and the relative 
weakness of its member states concurred in conceptualization 
of the area, from a security perspective, as a “weak sub-complex” 
within the post-Soviet Regional Security Complex, centred on 
Russian hegemony.37 The lack of the CARs’ common will and 
vision has, instead, mainly to do with the intra-regional compe-
tition for hegemony or dominance. From this perspective, the 
dynamics of regional cooperation closely resemble the neo-re-
alist dynamics of alliances, both being shaped by the pursuit of 
36 R. Allison, “Regionalism, regional structures and security management in 
Central Asia”, International Affairs, vol.80, no.3, 2004, pp.463-483.
37 B. Buzan and O. Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of  International Security, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 423, 428–429.
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power and security.38 In the peculiar Central Asian sub-com-
plex, these dynamics are naturally multi-layered, with power 
relations impinging upon a triple yet interconnected level of 
competition – i.e. regional, supra-regional and global. That is, 
power competition at the regional level coexists with and is part 
of power competition at the supra-regional, involving major 
neighboring powers like Russia and China.39 The latter level, 
in turn, takes shape within a wider, multi-regional competition 
for power with the global hegemon – the US – shaping mul-
ti-leveled yet overlapping interactions.
Intra-regional competition for influence emerged primarily 
from the Astana-Tashkent dualism, which, with rare excep-
tions, is considered by scholars to have been a key impediment 
to integration projects in Central Asia.40 Uzbekistan considers 
itself, and is widely considered by the literature, to be the re-
gion’s “natural hegemon”, in terms of both material power re-
sources and historical legitimating factors.41 Consequently, it 
has traditionally pursued a regional cooperation agenda simul-
taneously pursing an hegemonic regionalism centered “around 
38 R. Allison (2004).
39 For the sake of  brevity, we do not mention other, non-regional actors – namely 
Japan, Turkey, India and Iran – whose projections towards Central Asia result in 
the widening of  the CARs alignment options.
40 M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse, (2012); A. Bohr (2004). For an opposite point of  
view, F. Tolipov et al., Five States and/or One Region? National-Regional Dualism in 
Central Asia, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Almaty, 2016,  pp.22-24.
41 Uzbekistan’s power resources result from a mix of  geographic, ethno-
demographic and cultural factors. Geographically, it lies at the core of  the 
region, sharing a border with all the CARs while lacking a common border with 
Russia. At the same time, it is the most populous and one of  the ethnically most 
homogeneous Central Asian country, while Uzbek minorities are present in each 
of  the CARs (see tab.1). Finally, the historicization of  the nation  made the county 
heir of  Central Asian key historical cultural centers, like Samarkand and Bukhara. 
See, e.g., S. Cornell, “Uzbekistan: A regional player in Eurasiangeopolitics?”, 
European Security, vol.9, no.2, 2000, pp.115-140.
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the Tashkent metropolis”42 and balancing strategies vis-à-vis 
Russian hegemony in the regional sub-complex. Conversely, and 
as already seen, Kazakhstan traditionally advanced its dominant 
regional role – which in purely economic terms grew steadily as 
a result of the exploitation of its energy potential – by virtue of 
its strategic entente with Russia, stemming from the deep links 
between the two countries and as a counterweight to Uzbek 
regional policies. Therefore, although both countries nominally 
pursue “multi-vectoral” foreign policy strategies,43 the under-
standing of the formula is quite different in Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan and, due to the peculiarities of regional coopera-
tion, in any case these were conducive to integration patterns 
in Central Asia. 
While the already-mentioned self-imposed Turkmen isola-
tionism has cut off Ashgabat from regional interactions, power 
competition and power asymmetry within the Central Asian 
region also contributes to explaining the attitudes toward co-
operation of the weakest CARs in terms of power resources, 
namely Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. That is, their participation 
in regional frameworks for cooperation resulted primarily from 
an attempt to constrain the influence of more powerful coun-
tries and, in particular, to counterbalance the perceived threat 
coming from Uzbekistan. Thus, Dushanbe and Bishkek’s par-
ticipation in regional organizations has been consistent with 
strategies of allying with Russia, hegemon within the wider 
post-Soviet Regional Security Complex, or with Kazakhstan, 
by virtue of the perceived formation of a Moscow-Astana ax-
is.44 On this backdrop, power competition ended up by also 
hindering cooperation in the economic sector, already weak-
ened by the above-mentioned protectionist attitudes. Besides 
42 A. Bohr, Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy, London, Royal Institute for 
International Affairs, 1998, p.50.
43 See: N. Contessi (2015) “Foreign and Security Policy Diversification in Eurasia: 
Issue Splitting, Co-alignment, and Relational Power”, Problems of  Post-Communism, 
vol.62, no.5, 2015, pp.299-311.
44 See, e.g., A. Bohr (2004), p.492.
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the failed Kazakhstani attempt to involve Uzbekistan in re-
gional agreements, power competition also prevented upstream 
and downstream water-resource countries – i.e. Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, on the one side, Uzbekistan, on the other – to de-
velop consistent frameworks for cooperation fostering func-
tional interdependence.45
In the absence of shared risk-opportunity perceptions and 
goals, the CARs manifested a certain degree of convergence 
only on practical and identifiable security benefits.46 This was 
the case, for example of the negotiation on border demarca-
tion between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
which led to the establishment of the Shanghai Group in 1996, 
as well as of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone 
(CANWFZ), signed in 2006 by the heads of state of the CARs, 
thereby committed to not producing, acquiring, testing, stock-
ing or possessing nuclear arms.47 In both cases, however, the 
involvement of external actors, namely China and Russia – i.e. 
respectively as part of the agreement or as mere facilitator of 
the negotiations – played a crucial role in defusing traditional 
reciprocal suspicions between the CARs.
The chiefly “instrumental” nature of Central Asian region-
alism – i.e. its being respondent to power competition rather 
than to integration aims – also presided over the phenomenon 
of “revolving-door” membership in regional organizations, 
shaped first and foremost by Uzbekistan. Tashkent, the “re-
gional chameleon”,48 in fact pursued a seemingly unintelli-
45 The only exception to this rule is the International Fund for Saving the Aral 
Sea (IFAS), established in 1993 on international community’s pressure and on 
Kazakhstan’s initiative. IFAS, which brings together all the CARs, has long 
remained dormant and is still highly ineffective, having acquired a trans-national 
dimension based upon shared rules of  operation only with its “3rd Aral Sea Basin 
Programme” (2011-2015). At the time of  writing, negotiations are still underway 
for the approval of  the 4th Programme. 
46 R. Allison (2004), p.482.
47 M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse, (2012), p.8.
48 A. Bohr (2004), p.499.
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gible “pendulum politics” between different and sometimes 
opposing arrangements, guided by balancing needs that were 
changing along with regional circumstances – i.e. along with 
the shifting power balance between the CARs as well as with 
the degree of competitive engagement in the region by external 
powers. As a consequence, while the resolve to balance Russia 
led Uzbekistan to withdraw from the CST and to simultane-
ously join the “Western-minded” and US-supported GUAM 
in 1999, in the aftermath of the Andijan events and in the face 
of consequently growing Western criticism, Tashkent made 
another U-turn, leaving the latter in 2005 and re-joining the 
former in 2006, only to withdraw once again in 2012, mainly 
as a reaction to perceived Russian interference in its sovereign 
prerogatives.49 
The different balancing needs – coupled with the already 
mentioned tendency to support purely declarative mechanisms 
for cooperation – led to the typically variable geometry charac-
terizing the numerous regional and supra-regional frameworks 
for cooperation (See tab. no.2), a set of “spaghetti-bowl”50 ar-
rangements which more often than not tended to replicate anal-
ogous functions and prerogatives, though largely unfulfilled. 
The externally driven nature of Central Asian 
cooperation
Resulting primarily from the different and often incompatible 
priorities of the CARs, the primacy of supra-regional frame-
works for cooperation in Central Asia emerges first and fore-
most from their longevity and relative effectiveness. While not 
presiding over regional integration, nevertheless organizations 
like the CIS, the CSTO, or the SCO showed an elevated degree 
49 See M. Laruelle, Factoring the Regional Impact of  Uzbekistan’s Withdrawal from the 
CSTO, The German Marshall Fund of  the United States, On Wider Europe, 
no.24, 2012.
50 R. Pomfret (2009), p.51.
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of resilience and accomplished significant results, although 
more often than not different from their respective statutory 
goals – e.g. in terms of sovereignty- or regime-boost effects or 
in those of socialization.51
Recognizing the primacy of externally driven frameworks 
for cooperation does not imply portraying the CARs as mere 
“pawns” of a power competition unfolding among major pow-
ers. Contrary to the stereotypical image of the CARs as passive 
actors within “New Great Game”, they managed to impose 
“local rules” on international players.52 That is, the geopolitical 
competition centered on Central Asia left the CARs with sig-
nificant room for maneuver between external powers, enabling 
them to pursue, according to respective priorities, balancing 
strategies toward different actors at different times, as well as to 
employ pick-and-choose strategies and aligning-for-profit policies 
– in terms of attracting foreign aid or investments as well as in 
terms of rent-seeking activities.53 On this backdrop, the CARs’ 
“international agency” clearly benefited from systemic shifts 
impinging upon regional dynamics. This was particularly the 
case in the aftermath of 9/11 and the launch of the Enduring 
Freedom Operation by the US’ Bush Administration, which 
widened Central Asian states’ ability to extract benefits from 
51 As for the need to evaluate the efficacy of  organization taking into account 
participants’ expectations rather than declared outputs see: E. Vinokurov and A. 
Libman (2017); J. Linn and O. Pidufala, Lessons for Central Asia. Experience with 
Regional Economic Cooperation, ADB, Manila, 2009.
52 For a recent scholarly contribution dispelling the assumption of  CARs as mere 
passive pawns in the context of  regional competition among great powers, see A. 
Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2012. In the same vein, S. Cummings (2013).
53 See, A. Bohr (2004); E.  Kavalski, “Partnership or rivalry between the EU, India 
and China in Central Asia”, European Law Journal, vol.13, no.6, 2007, pp.839-856; 
S. Schiek, “The Afghanistan Conflict As a Power Resource for Central Asia?”, in 
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of  Hamburg 
(ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2014, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2015, pp.301-313.
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great powers’ interest in and projection toward the area.54 
However, as far as regional cooperation is concerned, the re-
sultant broadening of alignment options run counter to the de-
velopment of regional arrangements not only by decreasing the 
CARs’ interest in multilateral initiatives, but also by increasing 
intra-regional competition for distributive gains.55 Moreover, in 
a region shaped by deep power competition, the US’ power 
projection – pursued eminently on a bilateral base – ended up 
in widening the power asymmetry between the CARs to the 
benefit of its main strategic interlocutors, chiefly Uzbekistan.56
The main reason for the relative success of the externally driv-
en cooperation frameworks, and particularly of the Russian- 
and Chinese-led, has been their declarative, non-invasive na-
ture. It primarily resulted from the legitimation and “defensive” 
goals characterizing Moscow’s and Beijing’s initiatives, aimed at 
legitimately enhancing their regional power status and at pro-
jecting respective foreign policy culture abroad, so that “their 
narrative of regionalism in fact sometimes corresponds more 
to a hidden bilateralism and a strategy for an anti-American 
multipolarity”.57
Yet during the 90s the Russian-led initiatives showed the 
typical shortcomings of a so-called “holding-together” region-
alism – i.e. a cooperation path taking shape among states that 
previously belonged to a common polity.58 Apart from the al-
ready-mentioned lower propensity to renounce state autonomy 
54 A good example of  this trend is provided by Alexander Cooley’s account of  
the competition between the U.S. and Russia ignited by Kyrgyzstani authorities 
over the lease of  the Manas airbase. See A. Cooley (2012), pp.116-133.
55 A. Bohr (2004), p.492.
56 As highlighted by Bohr (2004, p.492), Uzbekistan may indeed considered 
the “primary beneficiary” of  US regional policy. Besides the high benefits 
extracted in merely economic terms, in strategic ones Tashkent signed with the 
US a Declaration on Strategic Partnership which committed the latter – though 
vaguely – to ensure the national security and territorial integrity of  the former.
57 M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse, (2012), p.6.
58 E. Vinokurov and A. Libman (2017), p.44.
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typical of newly independent countries, this had chiefly to 
do with the politicized nature of the initiatives, which entail 
a highly symbolic value. Consistently, the membership in or 
withdrawal from cooperation frameworks like the CIS or the 
CSTO had more to do with the CARs’ bilateral relations with 
Russia than with the institutional aims of the organizations, the 
more so as a consequence of their declarative nature. 
On this backdrop – and in the wider context of shifting 
regional dynamics – China’s increasing participation in and 
promotion of cooperation mechanisms in Central Asia made 
it possible to overcome two key shortcomings of the Russian-
led proposals put forward during the 90s. First, by reducing 
the unidirectional power asymmetry and the politicization 
inscribed in the latter, the involvement of Beijing allowed the 
CARs to counterbalance Russian dominance, facilitating the 
participation of actors traditionally suspicious of Moscow’s 
goals. This seems to be, for instance, the case with Uzbekistan’s 
participation in the SCO. Secondly, China’s initiatives – and 
particularly the institutionalization of the Shanghai cooperation 
in 2001 – helped identify previously missing common threats. 
This was the case with the so-called “three evils” threatening the 
region, namely terrorism, extremism and separatism – a combi-
nation of menaces particularly felt across Central Asia after the 
1999-2000 campaign of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU)59 and traditionally also felt in Russia and China, whose 
projections towards the region had anti-terror needs among its 
main drivers.60  
The peculiar understanding of security in Central Asia – con-
ceived as both state security and regime security – had clear 
repercussions on the risk-opportunity perceptions of the local 
59 M. Brill Olcott, Radical Islamist Mobilization in Central Asia, Carnegie Moscow 
Center, November 14, 2000.
60 The reference here is to the need to curtail the threat arising from Uyghur 
separatism, based in the northwestern Xinjiang region and benefiting from 
strong transnational connections with the CARs, with whom the Uyghur share 
religious affiliation and the ethno-linguistic Turkic background.
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leaderships and, consequentially, on the meaning and breadth 
of balancing strategies themselves. In the CARs’ leaderships 
view, balancing and alignment strategies are indeed aimed at 
contrasting not merely external threats to state survival, but 
also internal threats to regime stability, thus making applica-
ble the concept of omnibalancing developed for Third World 
countries.61 This consideration is quite important in apprais-
ing the parameters of the CARs’ security concepts as they have 
been developing since the beginning of the century, informing 
attitudes towards security cooperation and, significantly, forg-
ing a still in-a-nutshell regional security identity shared by both 
Russia and China. The peculiar CARs’ concept of security and 
the resulting omnibalancing needs stood as one of the main 
limits to Western-led sub-regional initiatives for cooperation 
and as an incentive to enhance cooperation with the neigh-
boring powers. Above all, it was the regime change impetus as-
sociated with the Bush Doctrine, on the one hand, and the 
normative essence inscribed in the EU’s regional projection, on 
the other, which openly collided with the CARs’ leaderships 
preferences and perspectives on cooperation. That is, both US 
and EU regional strategies entailed a degree of – more or less 
manifest – interference in the CARs’ domestic affairs which 
openly collided with their leaderships’ preferences and attitudes 
towards cooperation, centered upon the pillar of non-inter-
ference in sovereign states’ domestic affairs. Therefore, widen-
ing the concept of a “protective integration” working against 
Western efforts to impose external values,62 it can be argued, as 
Ziegler did,63 that the CARs’ preferences for alignment do not 
61 See C. Ziegler, “Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus after the Georgia 
Conflict”, in R. Kanet (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, Basingstoke 
and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p.162.
62 R. Allison (2008).
63 C. Ziegler, “Sovereignty, Security and Intervention in Central Asia”, in M. 
Sussex and R. Kanet (eds.), Russia, Eurasia and the New Geopolitics of  Energy. 
Confrontation and Consolidation, Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015, pp.91-111.
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primarily result from analogies in authoritarian rule, but rather 
from the shared interpretation of and full respect for state sov-
ereignty, consistent with their post-colonial nature. It is from 
this perspective that the enhancement of the CARs’ security 
cooperation with Russia and China within CSTO and SCO 
should be seen in the aftermath of both the “colored revolu-
tions” and the wave of “Arab Springs”. Moscow and Beijing’s 
advancement of a “regional ownership” principle founded upon 
the non-intervention of outside powers in the region, as well as 
their adherence to the principles of near-absolute sovereignty, 
non-intervention, and non-interference in states’ internal af-
fairs – testified to by the position taken vis-à-vis the Andijan 
unrest in 2004 and the 2010 interethnic Uzbek-Kyzgyz clashes 
occurring in South Kyrgyzstan – perfectly fit with the CARs’ 
perceptions and attitudes.
The centrality of the above-mentioned principles in shaping the 
CARs’ attitude toward cooperation and toward externally driv-
en initiatives helps to shed light on the latest dynamics shaping 
the multi-layered search for security and cooperation in Central 
Asia. While over the last decade the shift in Chinese regional pol-
icy from a defensive and reactive stance to a proactive one has 
widened Beijing’s interaction with and economic grip over the 
CARs, at the same time Russia’s aggressive stance in its so-called 
near abroad backfired on its regional initiatives. Indeed, the four-
year-long and still unsolved Ukrainian crisis, besides exerting a 
negative impact on Moscow’s drive towards integration within 
the Eurasian Economic Union,64 impinged upon the CARs’ at-
titudes towards cooperation with Russia, fostering more resolute 
balancing strategies even by those countries – like, for instance, 
Kazakhstan65 – which were traditionally more inclined to coop-
erate bilaterally and multilaterally with their northern neighbor. 
64 See R. Dragneva and K. Wolczuk, The Eurasian Economic Union Deals, Rules and 
the Exercise of  Power, Research Paper, London, Chatham House, 2017, pp.11-12.
65 See, e.g., D. Tynan, What does Kazakhstan’s new military doctrine reveal about its 
relations with Russia?, Eurasianet, December 7, 2017.
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In an opposite direction, China’s increasing projection to-
ward Central Asia did not come at the expense of Beijing’s 
firm adherence to the key pillars of its “peaceful rise” doctrine, 
which greatly suited national preferences and perspectives for 
cooperation in terms of balancing strategies as well as in terms 
of the economic benefits and development ensured by Beijing’s 
regional investments, directed mainly toward the energy and 
infrastructure sectors. Driven by economic as well as security 
interests and pursued mainly by boosting financial, commer-
cial and trade relations, China’s projection toward Central Asia 
has yielded impressive results in the course of the last decade. 
This trend appears evident in terms of growth in bilateral trade 
and investment inflows – which received a decisive boost as 
a result of the CARs’ involvement in the development of the 
overland component of the Belt and Road Initiative and as a 
consequence of Beijing’s strategy of energy procurement from 
the region. The results accomplished in the energy sector are 
particularly meaningful, in that they show China’s ability to 
step into a highly politicized realm and, by virtue of flexible, 
non-invasive and incentive-led policy,66 achieve notable out-
comes in a relatively limited timeframe – namely the construc-
tion of the Kazakhstan-China and Central Asia-China oil and 
gas pipelines. These infrastructures, besides breaking Russia’s 
quasi-monopoly over the purchase of Central Asian gas, deci-
sively contributed to shifting the region’s economic gravitation-
al pole eastward.
Conclusion: The main trends of cooperation 
in Central Asia 
The overlapping of and confusion between the multi-faceted 
state- and nation-building processes unfolding since 1991 in 
66 C. Frappi and M. Montanini, How does China’s thirst for oil and gas impact on EU’s 
energy policies? The Africa and Central Asia test cases, United Nations University, 
GR:EEN Policy Brief, no.21, 2014. 
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Central Asia is the single element which most influenced the 
way in which the CARs came to perceive the risks and oppor-
tunities arising from the post-Soviet transition, as well as their 
attitudes and preferences regarding bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation. On this backdrop, neither supranational identity 
commonalities nor the urgent need to re-launch and partially 
reinvent post-Soviet national economic apparatus were con-
ducive to regional integration and cooperation paths. Instead, 
identity and economic policies became either the logical prem-
ise or a privileged tool for affirmation of the primacy of security 
in domestic and foreign policy realms.
In a highly competitive environment, shaped by a peculiar 
multi-layered struggle for power and hegemony, the securi-
ty-first approach to inter-state relations and the peculiar CAR 
understanding of the concept of security shaped the way in 
which cooperation came to be perceived and pursued. That 
is, balancing and alliance purposes were crucial in shaping the 
CARs’ attitude towards regional cooperation in general and 
towards participation in single arrangements in particular. At 
the same time, legitimation and international recognition aims 
were and are still determinant in shaping the attitudes them-
selves, as well as socialization goals and the possibility to use 
cooperation frameworks as mere yet important “talking clubs”. 
In this, Central Asian regionalism thus turned out to be chief-
ly instrumental. Instrumentality, in turn, has been primarily 
responsible for the main, often cited characterizations scholars 
give to Central Asian regionalism and integration – from “vir-
tual” to “ink-on-paper”, from “spaghetti-bowl” to “protective”.
Intra-regional competition and more or less overt inter-state 
tensions are key hurdles to the development of a consistent 
drive toward economic or security cooperation in Central Asia, 
thereby widening external powers’ regional room for maneuver 
and enhancing their key role in putting forward and leading 
mechanisms for regional cooperation. It is therefore not by 
chance that the latter remains chiefly externally driven, even 
if the scope and breadth of initiatives coming from major 
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neighboring powers is rapidly changing. Indeed, current dy-
namics in inter-state cooperation show two apparently oppos-
ing yet connected trends. While they manifest the persistent 
weakness of regionalist trends, at the same time a fresh impe-
tus for the enhancement of inter-state bonds seems to follow 
China’s projection into the area, on the backdrop of growing 
resistance to Russian initiatives in its “near abroad” unfolding 
among regional actors. Indeed, thanks to Chinese infrastruc-
tural initiatives the CARs are indeed not only increasingly in-
terconnected among themselves, but are also more and more 
incorporated into a burgeoning trans-regional network that 
enhances Central Asia’s strategic geographic location. Thus, be-
sides having already modified to its own benefit the economic 
gravitational pole of Central Asia, China’s initiatives are fos-
tering a trend toward “regionalization from above”, consistent 
with the declared aim of turning Central Asia’s land-locked 
countries into “land-linked economies”. Such a trend seems 
to be confirmed and enhanced also by the enlargement of the 
SCO geographical scope, achieved through the engagement of 
extra-regional actors as members, observers or dialogue part-
ners. On this backdrop, while the regional “reluctant hegemon” 
stance of China – seemingly unwilling, for the time being, to 
challenge Russia’s traditional upper hand in security terms – 
doesn’t seem to entail significant incompatibilities among the 
main major powers active in Central Asia, it remains to be seen 
if and how the security needs associated with infrastructural 
developments will incentivize a renewed understanding of se-
curity cooperation in Central Asia, fostering fresh solutions to 
the dated issues arising from intra-regional competition and 
infighting. 
While Beijing seems to possess all the potential to act as a 
“game-changer” to supra-regional cooperation schemes, a fresh 
boost to enhance inter-state and multilateral cooperation may 
also arise from within Central Asia. Indeed, if the assumption 
of the hindering role to cooperation played by intra-regional 
competition for power and personalism-based policies holds 
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true, then new impetus to cooperation may results from the 
leadership change recently occurred in Uzbekistan. As a mat-
ter of fact, the succession of Shavkat Mirziyoyev to the “father 
of the nation” Islam Karimov has the potential to break the 
regional vicious circle generated by the competition between 
Tashkent and Astana as well as by the “insecurity spiral” shaping 
Uzbekistan’s relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. While is 
too early to assess the mid- and long-term consequences of the 
Uzbek leadership change, the latter has already shown its po-
tential67 in providing a much-needed regional confidence boost 
and, simultaneously, in setting a new stage for intra-regional 
dialogue potentially conducive to the definition of regional 
solution to the trans-national issues still affecting Central Asia, 
primarily in security terms.
67 The reference goes to the hosting in Samarkand, in November 2017, of  the 
conference “Central Asia: One Past and a Common Future, Cooperation for 
Sustainable Development and Mutual Prosperity” under the auspices of  the UN 
and the Uzbek Foreign Ministry, on the one hand, and to the participation to the 
first consultative meeting of  the CARs leaders held in Astana in March 2018 with 
a view to institutionalize regular meeting to jointly tackle the regional problems.
